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LABOR LAW-PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS-ACT 195-The Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania has held that interns, residents, and
clinical fellows are not employees under Pennsylvania's Public
Employe Relations Act and therefore are not entitled to bargain
collectively with their employers.
Philadelphia Association of Interns & Residents v. Albert Ein-
stein Medical Center, 369 A.2d 711 (Pa. 1976).
In 1970, the Philadelphia Association of Interns and Residents
(PAIR) filed with the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB)
a petition for representation under the Pennsylvania Public Em-
ploye Relations Act (Act 195).1 Although the PLRB originally dis-
missed the action, after the filing of exceptions by PAIR, the Labor
Board held that the interns, residents, and clinical fellows (house-
staff) of Albert Einstein Medical Center and Temple University
fell within the meaning of employee as defined in Act 1952 and
ordered a representation election.3 PAIR was elected the collective
bargaining agent of the housestaff and orders of certification were
issued. On appeal, the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas
affirmed the PLRB's findings that the housestaff were employees
within Act 195.1 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court reversed
the decision of the lower court,' emphasizing the educational ad-
vancement derived by the housestaff from their relationship with
the hospital. In its view, the housestaff did not fall within the mean-
ing of "public employe" in Act 1951 and thus were not entitled to
organizational rights under the state statute. In a 4-3 decision, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed.7
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-.2301 (Supp. 1976). If a party cannot obtain an
employer's consent to an election, it can file with the PLRB a petition for a representation
election. Id. § 1101.603(c).
2. Act 195 defines "public employe" as "any individual employed by a public employer."
Id. § 1101.301(2).
3. Employees of Albert Einstein Medical Center, No. PERA-R-237-E (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd.,
April 12, 1972).
4. Albert Einstein Medical Center v. PLRB, 3 Pa. Pub. Emp. Rep. 283 (1972).
5. Wills Eye Hosp. v. PLRB, 15 Pa. Commw. 532, 328 A.2d 539 (1974), aff'd sub nom.
Philadelphia Ass'n of Interns & Residents v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 369 A.2d 711
(Pa. 1976).
6. 15 Pa. Cmmw. at 542, 328 A.2d at 544.
7. Philadelphia Ass'n of Interns & Residents v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 369 A.2d
711 (Pa. 1976).
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The court first discussed the status of Albert Einstein Medical
Center's housestaff under Act 195 and decided the question was
moot. It held that a 1974 amendment to the Labor Management
Relations Act8 included private, nonprofit hospitals such as Albert
Einstein within its coverage; since the federal law preempted state
jurisdiction,' the housestaff of Albert Einstein Medical Center were
not entitled to organizational rights under Act 195. Temple Univer-
sity was not a private, nonprofit hospital, and the status of its
housestaff was still controlled by state law. The court, therefore,
addressed the status of these employees under Act 195.
Justice O'Brien, speaking for the majority, initially considered
the meaning of public employee under the Act. He found little guid-
ance in the Act's broad definition" to resolve this case of first im-
pression. Acknowledging the lack of case law on the question, the
court accepted as true the PLRB's findings of fact." It rejected,
however, the PLRB's conclusion that the housestaff were employees
under Act 195.12 The PLRB's determination that the housestaff were
8. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (Supp. 1975).
9. 369 A.2d at 713.
10. See note 2 supra for the statutory definition of "employe."
11. 369 A.2d at 714.
12. The dissents focused on the proper scope of review of decisions by administrative
agencies. The statutory test for the conclusiveness of the PLRB's findings of fact is whether
or not they are "supported by substantial and legally credible evidence." PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, § 1101.1502 (Supp. 1976). Justices Eagen and Roberts treated the issue of whether the
housestaff were employees under Act 195 as one of fact; in their view, the majority failed to
apply the proper statutory test and substituted its judgment for that of the PLRB. 369 A.2d
at 716-17; id. at 720-21 (dissenting opinions). One difficulty with Einstein is that the court
was presented not with a question of pure fact but with a mixed question of fact and law.
Whether or not the housestaff are employees as the word is commonly understood is a ques-
tion of fact. The question of law is one of statutory interpretation-whether the housestaff
were employees within that term's meaning in Act 195. When reviewing mixed questions of
law and fact in an administrative context, courts have applied one of two tests. A rational
basis standard may be used by a court to determine whether the agency's conclusion has a
rational basis in fact, or, a court may independently evaluate the facts and substitute its
judgment for that of the administrative agency. Compare Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941)
(upholding Director of Bituminous Coal Division's determination that railroad company that
consumed coal was not a "producer" of coal under the Bituminous Coal Act), with Texas Gas
Trans. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 363 U.S. 263, 270 (1960) (court of appeals was justified in
substituting its own judgment for that of the Federal Power Commission). See generally K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 30.06-.07, at 551-56 (3d ed. 1972).
The Einstein majority substituted its judgment for that of the PLRB. The dissenters argued
that the court should defer to the Board's expertise, use a rational basis test, and determine
whether the PLRB's conclusion could reasonably follow from the facts presented. Under that
test, they argued, the Board's determinations should have been binding. 369 A.2d at 716; id.
at 720-21 (dissenting opinions).
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employees was based on objective criteria such as the percentage of
time spent in patient care services as compared with time spent in
educational activities, federal income taxation of the housestaff's
wages, and the presence of other traditional indicators of employee
status. 3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, on the other hand,
adopted a subjective approach, in which the housestaff's motivation
in securing positions with the hospital was a critical factor in deter-
mining their status. 4
The housestaff were found to be motivated to attain employment
primarily by educational requirements 15 and opportunities for edu-
cational advancements, rather than by monetary compensation."
Despite the majority's concession that the housestaff were "clothed
with the indicia of employee status,"" the determination that remu-
neration did not constitute the students' quid pro quo for working
at the hospital precluded classifying the housestaff's affiliation with
the hospital as a typical employment relationship.' The majority
also emphasized the requirement that the residencies and intern-
ships be served at an approved hospital and believed that this re-
quirement negated the usual bargaining freedom generally asso-
ciated with an employer-employee relationship." Furthermore, in
13. 369 A.2d at 714. Other indicia were enumerated in the PLRB's brief to the Supreme
Court. The housestaff received Blue Cross-Blue Shield coverage, and major medical insur-
ance and group life insurance; they enjoyed parking, cafeteria, and laundry privileges as did
other employees of the hospital; the housestaff were covered by malpractice and workmen's
compensation insurance, and retained employee identification cards. Brief for Appellant
PLRB at 7-8, Philadelphia Ass'n of Interns & Residents v. Albert Einstein Medical Center,
369 A.2d 711 (Pa. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant PLRB].
14. 369 A.2d at 714.
15. Pennsylvania requires a one-year internship at an approved hospital as a prerequisite
to the practice of medicine. The State Board of Medical Education and Licensure requires
residency as a prerequisite for certification as a specialist. See Medical Practice Act of 1973,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 421.1-.18 (Supp. 1976). The Act also requires internships and
residencies to be served at an approved hospital, defined as "a hospital which has been
approved by the [State Board of Medical Education and Licensure] for providing supervised
graduate medical training." Id. § 421.2(9).
16. 369 A.2d at 714.
17. Id. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
18. 369 A.2d at 714.
19. Concededly, the housestaff's choice of work places is limited to a list of approved
hospitals. However, they are free to choose among these hospitals on the basis of such tradi-
tional factors as pay, benefits, prestige of the hospital, educational opportunities available,
and location. This would indicate a reasonable measure of freedom of choice which is indica-
tive of a normal employer-employee relationship. For a consideration of the limitations on
bargaining freedom discussed in the context of standardized contracts see generally MumtAY
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light of the short duration of the housestaff's relationship with the
hospital, granting them employee status under Act 195 would be
inconsistent with the spirit of the Act which the majority perceived
as contemplating the regulation of continuous employment relation-
ships. 20 The court found support for its decision in Cedars-Sinai
Medical Center & Cedars-Sinai Housestaff Association,2 1 where the
National Labor Relations Board had recently ruled that housestaff
at a medical center did not fall within the definition of employee
under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
Three justices disagreed with the majority's use of subjective cri-
teria to decide whether the housestaff were employees under Act
195. Justice Eagen pointed out that the subjective approach imple-
mented by the majority would not be applied to determine the
status of other persons whose primary motivation for attaining em-
ployment was the fulfillment of statutorily-mandated requirements
for a profession.2 He felt that adopting a subjective test could lead
to absurd results,2 3 and questioned the majority's reliance on
Cedars-Sinai since the National Labor Relations Board had also
applied a subjective test.24 Justice Manderino concurred with this
view.2
ON CONTRACTS § 350, at 735-39 (2d rev. ed. 1974). See also J. CALAMAR & J. PERILLO, THE LAW
OF CONTRAT § 3, at 4-6 (1970).
20. 369 A.2d at 715.
21. 91 L.R.R.M. 1398 (1976).
22. Justice Eagen pointed out that two years of employment with a public accounting firm
is normally a prerequisite for becoming a certified public accountant. See generally PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 9.4 (Supp. 1976). He argued that the majority would not use the subjective
approach to deny employee status to an accountant who secures employment with a public
accounting firm primarily to meet the statutory requirements for qualifying as a certified
public accountant. 369 A.2d at 716 (dissenting opinion).
23. Under a subjective test, two individuals could stand in the same relationship to the
hospital or firm, yet one would be an employee because his motivation in securing a position
was monetary compensation, while the other would not be an employee because his motiva-
tion was educational advancement. 369 A.2d at 716.
24. Id. The National Labor Relation Board's decision in Cedars-Sinai is contrary to exist-
ing authority on the question. See id. and cases cited therein. Justice Eagen also thought it
significant that the only tribunal to consider the issue of employee status of housestaff
subsequent to Cedars-Sinai rejected the NLRB's, reasoning. See Cambridge Hosp. House
Officers Ass'n, No. MRC-2163 (Mass. Lab. Rel. Comm'n, April 29, 1976).
25. 369 A.2d at 724 (dissenting opinion). Justice Manderino also dissented from the ma-
jority's disposition of the issue of the status of Albert Einstein Medical Center's housestaff.
See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra. He believed this issue could not properly be decided
without giving full consideration to whether the 1974 amendment to the Labor Management
Relations Act should be given retroactive effect.
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Justice Roberts noted that the majority was judicially creating an
exception to the broad definition of employee contained in Act 195.25
The Pennsylvania General Assembly had set forth specific excep-
tions to the Act's broad coverage and Justice Roberts felt that the
court should be reluctant to create others by negative implication.
According to Justice Roberts, the housestaff's salaried affiliation
with the hospital, when considered with the Act's purpose, sup-
ported a finding of employee status under Act 195.25 His perception
differed from the majority's view of the Act's objective. He believed
that Act 195 was intended to safeguard the public interest in ser-
vices rendered by-public employees byproviding collective bargain-
ing as a means of insuring stability and peace in the public employ-
ment sector. Once it was determined that the housestaff were per-
forming public services, the duration of their relationship with the
hospital and student status were not determinative of their treat-
ment under the Act. 29
The meaning of the term "employe" under Act 195 cannot be
properly considered without regard to the purpose underlying enact-
ment of the legislation. Under the Public Employe Act of 1947,11
public employees had neither the right to strike nor the right to
bargain collectively with their employers. 32 This statutory predeces-
sor of Act 195, however, was ineffective and incapable of enforce-
ment; illegal strikes were commonplace, strife and unrest in public
26. 369 A.2d at 722 (dissenting opinion).
27. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.301(2) (Supp. 1976) for the enumerated exclusions.
28. 369 A.2d at 721 (dissenting opinion). See note 36 infra for the Pennsylvania General
Assembly's view of Act 195's purpose.
29. 369 A.2d at 722 (dissenting opinion). The educational requirements and student status
of the housestaff were, however, recognized by Justice Roberts as factors which may appropri-
ately be considered by the employer in collectively bargaining with the housestaff.
30. Justice Roberts argued that the words of a statute must be construed in light of the
act's purpose. 369 A.2d at 723 (dissenting opinion). He cited NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121
F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941), where Judge Learned Hand discussed employer free speech under
the NLRA and stressed the importance of viewing words in that context. See also NLRB v.
Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 403 (1947) (pointing out the necessity of considering the congres-
sional policy underlying the NLRA when determining the status of plant guards under the
Act); Costigan v. Philadelphia Fin. Dep't Employees Local 696, 462 Pa. 425, 341 A.2d 456
(1975) (deciding the issue of employer status under Act 195 and accepting the Supreme
Court's reasoning in NLRB v. Atkins & Co., supra).
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 215.1-,5, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-
.2301 (Supp. 1976).
32. See PLRB v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 502-03, 337 A.2d 262, 266
(1975) (discussing public employees' status before enactment of Act 195).
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employment became prevalent." Pennsylvania's Governor Shafer
formed the Commission to Review the Public Employe Law of
Pennsylvania to investigate the causes of this unrest 3 l4 and its poten-
tial danger. The Commission concluded that the lack of the right
to bargain collectively was the greatest single cause, of strikes in the
public sector.3 5 It recommended to the General Assembly that pub-
lic employees be accorded representation rights. In Act 195, the
Pennsylvania legislature adopted the Commission's proposal, and
recognized the need to eliminate the possible deleterious effects of
poor labor relations between public employees and their employ-
ers.
36
In dealing with legislation regulating labor relations, an examina-
tion of the purpose of an act is central to a judicial construction of
its terms. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, in resolving the
issue of employee status under the NLRA for the purpose of granting
collective bargaining rights, has looked to the purpose of that Act
and considered whether granting such rights in a particular case
would further its purpose. 37 Prior to Einstein, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court had adopted the United States Supreme Court's ap-
proach to the NLRA in deciding a case involving the construction
of the term "employer" under Act 195. 38 The majority's construction
33. Id. For statistics on the number of illegal strikes in the middle and late 1960's see
Weisenfeld, Public Employees Are Still Second Class Citizens, 20 LAB. L.J. 138, 140 (1969).
See also Fleming, Public Employee Unionism, 9 GA. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1974), where the author
presents arguments for according public employees the right to strike.
34. See PLRB v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 502-03, 337 A.2d 262, 266
(1975) (reviewing factors which led to formation of the Commission). See REPORT AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION-TO REVISE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYE LAW OF
PENNSYLVANIA Appendix A (1968) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION].
The Commission conferred with officials of Wisconsin and Michigan, along with those of New
York City, regarding the administration of their laws regulating collective bargaining in the
public sector. Id. at 1.
35. REPORT OF GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, supra note 34, at 9.
36. The public policy and purpose stated in Act 195 is
to promote orderly and constructive relationships between all public employers and
their employes subject, however, to the paramount right of the citizens of this Com-
monwealth to keep inviolate the guarantees for their health, safety and welfare. Unre-
solved disputes between the public employer and its employes are injurious to the
public and the General Assembly is therefore aware that adequate means must be
established for minimizing them and providing for their resolution.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (Supp. 1976). For judicial commentary on Act 195's purpose
see PLRB v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 503, 337 A.2d 262, 266 (1975).
37. See NLRB v. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 414 (1947).
38. See Costigan v. Philadelphia Fin. Dep't Employee Local 696, 462 Pa. 425, 341 A.2d
Vol. 15: 349
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of employe in Einstein, however, is inconsistent with this approach.
Moreover, the nature of the housestaff's services further indicates
that an objective approach, looking to the purpose of the Act, should
have been adopted. The housestaff are directly involved in provid-
ing vital health care services to the public. 9 Work interruptions in
the hospital might have direct injurious effects on the flow of an
important public service. 0 A construction of "employe" which
would grant the housestaff employee status under Act 195 and ac-
cord them the right to bargain collectively would seem to be appro-
priate from the perspective of the historical objective of the Act.4'
A major impetus for the passage of Act 195 was a concern that
poor labor relations in the public sector could adversely affect the
community through inadequate provision of public services.42 Under
the Act, the employment relationship itself, and the interests of the
individuals involved, were considered to be secondary to the para-
mount interests of the public.4" The subjective approach adopted by
the court in Einstein, however, focuses on the individual employee
interests, rather than on the state's interest in the uninterrupted
flow of public services. One factor which the majority believed to be
particularly significant in deciding that the interns and residents
were precluded from coverage under the Act was the brevity of their
employment relationship with the hospital." Yet other jurisdictions
dealing with the issue of whether to extend collective bargaining
rights to housestaff have rejected duration of the employment rela-
tionship, along with educational requirements and student status,
as determinative of their right to collectively bargain.45
456 (1975), adopting the Supreme Court's rationale in Atkins in order to assess employer
status under Act 195. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
39. See 369 A.2d at 724 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 717 (Eagen, J., dissenting).
41. See id. at 723-24 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
42. For a brief discussion of the purpose of Act 195 see Board of Educ. v. Philadelphia
Fed'n of Teachers Local 3, 346 A.2d 35, 39 (Pa. 1975); Western Psychiatric Institute & Clinic
v. Commonwealth, 16 Pa. Commw. 204, 211, 330 A.2d 257, 261 (1974).
43. See note 36 supra.
44. 369 A.2d at 715.
45. The Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission has held that the housestaff of a
private, nonprofit hospital have employee status under the Massachusetts law granting
collective bargaining rights to public employees. Cambridge Hosp. House Officers Ass'n, No.
MRC-2163 (Mass. Lab. Rel. Comm'n, April 29, 1976). See MAss. Gms. LAws ch. 150E, §§ 1-
15 (Supp. 1976). The New York Labor Relations Board has accorded housestaff at nonprofit,
voluntary hospitals employee status under that state's law granting collective bargaining
1976-77
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Had the Einstein majority adopted a more objective analysis to
assess whether the interns and residents were employees within the
meaning of Act 195, they probably would have reached a contrary
result. This contention finds support in cases decided in the area of
tax law. Tax cases recognize that the usual bargained-for exchange
present in the typical employment relationship-monetary compen-
sation-is not absent from the housestaff's employment relationship
with a hospital.46 Section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code excludes
from gross income amounts received as a scholarship or fellowship
grant. 7 Housestaff salaries generally fail to qualify for this exclu-
sion,4" the salaries being subject to income tax as normal gross in-
come.49 The fact that any educational benefit was derived from the
services of housestaff neither negated their status as salaried em-
ployees, nor qualified them for tax benefits under federal law.50 De-
cisions holding housestaff ineligible for the section 117 exclusion
have indicated that the housestaff bargained for both educational
and monetary compensation. While academic considerations at-
tracted the housestaff to particular hospitals, that element consti-
rights to certain employees. The Long Island College Hosp., No. SE-4295 (N.Y. Lab. Rel. Bd.,
April 29, 1970); Brooklyn Eye & Ear Hosp., No. SE-42496 (N.Y. Lab. Rel. Bd., March 11,
1969). While there are slight differences in the language of the Massachusetts, New York, and
Pennsylvania Acts, the rationale applied by the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission
and the New York State Labor Relations Board would seem relevant to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's consideration of the status of Temple's housestaff under Act 195. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, did not discuss these decisions.
46. Hembreev. United States, 464.F.2d 1262 (4th Cir. 1972) (compensation to hospital
resident constituted part of mutual consideration for services performed and was subject to
income tax). Cf. Tobin v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 239 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (holding that
monetary compensation constituted only part of resident physician's quid pro quo and point-
ing out absurdity of maintaining that trained professionals would accept a position which
paid such low compensation absent educational opportunities).
47. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 117. For a definition of scholarship and fellowship grants
see Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3 (1953).
48. See, e.g., Tobin v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 239 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (compensation
paid to resident physician not excludable under § 117); Kwass v. United States, 319 F. Supp.
186 (E.D. Mich. 1970) (compensation paid to resident physician while affiliated with univer-
sity hospital not excludable under § 117); Wertzberger v. United States, 315 F. Supp. 34
(W.D. Mo. 1970).
49. The Internal Revenue Code specifically includes in gross income amounts received as
compensation for services rendered. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 61.
50. See, e.g., Wertzberger v. United States, 315 F. Supp. 34, 35 (W.D. Mo. 1970), where
the court held a resident physician liable for federal income tax and stated: "Resident physi-
cians obviously are both receiving an education and rendering valuable services to the hospi-
tal, resulting in mutual benefit, to the hospital and to themselves." See also Kwass v. United
States, 319 F. Supp. 186, 188 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
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tuted only part of the bargained-for exchange.5' By noting that ful-
fillment of educational requirements was the housestaff's primary
purpose for being at Temple, and concluding that these require-
ments negated employee status of the housestaff within the mean-
ing of Act 195,52 the majority in Einstein ignored the fact that only
a small percentage of the housestaff's time was spent in educational
activity. 53 And, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court majority has
taken a position seemingly inconsistent with federal determination
for income tax purposes of the status of housestaff similarly situated
to those at Temple University. Whether housestaff are employees
under federal income tax law need not be dispositive of their em-
ployee status under Act 195. 51 However, other jurisdictions have
found income tax status to be a relevant consideration in determin-
ing whether housestaff fall within the purview of statutes granting
employees collective bargaining rights.55
In concluding that housestaff are not public employees under the
Act, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court apparently believed that the
potentially injurious effects flowing from disruptive labor relations
in the public sector which gave rise to Act 195 were not a substantial
threat in the housestaff's situation. Hence, it was not necessary to
accord these individuals the right to strike or bargain collectively
with their employer. The Einstein decision is troublesome in a num-
ber of ways. Before the question of the statutory right to strike or
collectively bargain with a public employer can be reached, the
determination must be made that the individuals seeking the right
51. See note 46 supra.
52. See 369 A.2d at 714.
53. Id. at 721-22 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
54. See Sweet v. PLRB, 457 Pa. 456, 461-62, 322 A.2d 362, 364-65 (1974) (recognizing the
relevancy of tests developed in other areas of law to the determination of an employment
relationship under Act 195).
55. See Cambridge Hosp. House Officers Ass'n, No. MRC-2163 (Mass. Lab. Rel. Comm'n,
April 29, 1976). The Commisson discussed the relevance of the housestaffs treatment under
the federal income tax law to their status under the Massachusetts law granting public
employees collective bargaining rights. See note 45 supra for the relevant statutory sections.
It concluded that their status as employees within the meaning of the federal tax law sup-
ported a finding that they were employees under the state law granting collective bargaining
rights. See note 45 supra. See also Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Michigan Employment Rel.
Comm'n, 389 Mich. 96, 204 N.W.2d 218 (1973). In determining the employee status of house-
staff under the Michigan Public Employee Act, MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.455(1)-(16) (Supp.
1976), the Michigan Supreme Court also thought it significant that the housestaff were
ineligible for the scholarship or fellowship exclusion of the INT. Rxv. CODz of 1954, § 117. See
text accompanying notes 46-51 infra.
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are employees under Act 195. There are, however, no limitations on
work stoppages or other means of asserting bargaining strength by
nonemployees. Perhaps the court, in choosing to create an exception
to Act 195's broad statutory definition," did not consider the ramifi-
cations of its determination. The decision left the housestaff with
no restrictions on their ability to apply economic pressure against
the hospital. Thus the housestaff as nonemployees could conceiv-
ably achieve the same objectives as they would seek through collec-
tive bargaining or strikes regulated by Act 195. At the same time,
as nonemployees, the housestaff are without the protection granted
employees under the Act.
Denying housestaff the benefits of the state's public employee
legislation is contrary to decisions in other jurisdictions 7 and argua-
bly subverts the legislative intent embodied in the Act. '" The
subjective approach utilized by the Court, while consistent with the
National Labor Relations Board's position in Cedars-Sinai, renders
the applicability of Act 195 dependent upon the motivations of the
individuals involved, and makes questionable the Act's extension to
employees whose reasons for choosing particular employment go
beyond remuneration. Although Einstein ostensibly settles the issue
whether interns, residents, and clinical fellows are entitled to collec-
tive bargaining rights under Act 195, it provides the PLRB with
little guidance for future determinations of employee status under
the Act."
Phyllis J. Palascak
56. 369 A.2d at 722 (dissenting opinion).
57. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
58. See notes 31-41 and accompanying text supra.
59. The PLRB's counsel has expressed concern for its inability to determine the status of
an individual under Act 195 in light of the Einstein decision. See Brief for Appellant PLRB,
supra note 13, at 49. On February 16, 1977, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied
rehearing of its decision.
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